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Comments
CoURTs-PowERs-NEwsPAPER REPoRumR's BIG T TOA~rrN TRLAL.-

Reporters for a local newspaper, brought a mandamus proceeding to
prohibit the county judge from excluding them from a trial involving
juveniles at which other members of the public, including other members of the press, were permitted to be present. The judge excluded
the reporters because their newspaper printed names of juvenile
witnesses in violation of his directive. The trial was in the adultdivision of juvenile court and the accused was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The circuit court entered a
judgment against the judge, and he appealed. Held: Affirmed. A
county judge may not condition a reporters presence at the public
trial of an adult on the reporters agreement not to publish names of
juveniles involved. Johnson v. Simpson, 488 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968).
The Johnson case raises a broad issue concerning the discretionary
power of a juvenile judge to exclude persons, namely a segment of
the press, from a public trial.1 The case further raises the significant
issue of the propriety of publishing names of juveniles involved in an
adult trial in which the juvenile is a witness or victim.
Turning to the broader issue of exclusion, does the press as members of the public have a legitimate interest in court proceedings2
and, further, an enforceable right to attend them?
Historically, judges have had the power to use discretion in
regulating attendance at least to the extent necessary to assure the
security and orderly progress of a trial. 3 Instances where a judge has,
by his own discretion, invoked the power to exclude persons for such
reasons are numerous.4 For the most part, courts have held that any
order of exclusion should expressly exempt representatives of the bar, 5
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Also the constitutions of forty-one states specifically2 provide for a public trial. See e.g., Ky. CONST. § 11.
Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944). In this case
an attorney who had been excluded was said to have a legitimate interest in the
proceedings
and allowed to remain.
3
R. Bowmis, JUDICr.AL. DiscRrox or TamAL CounTs § 262, at 296-97 (1931).
4 United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) (to prevent undue
crowding); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) (to spare
young witnesses from embarrassment); State v. Genese, 102 NJ. 32, 130 A. 642
(1925) (to preserve courtroom decorum); People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E.
306 (1931) (to preserve public health); Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa.
587, 104 A. 53 (1918) (to prevent violence against witness).
GBeagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Beauchamp v.
Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944).
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representatives of the press, 6 and friends of the accused.7 In Keddington v. State,8 it was held that the importance of the presence of the
press assured a just trial even more certainly than the presence of many
spectators.

Although historically the public trial did not develop out of any
particular solicitude for the person on trial, the popular conception
today is that the right to a public trial exists primarily for the benefit
of the accused and the incidental observer attends not as a matter of
right but as a matter of courtesy. 9 However, Bentham's viewpoint
differs from this particular interpretation of history. He saw the public
trial as a public right intended to insure the proper administration of
justice. 10 English' and American 2 cases have treated the right

as one belonging to both the defendant and the public. The real basis
for the public's right to attend trials has stemmed from fear that the

judiciary might become a means to tyranny and despotism. Publicity
has been deemed the answer to this potential evil.Y3 As Continental

experience has demonstrated, judicial laxity and venality increase in

the absence of critical scrutiny. 14 Unless the necessity of excluding the

public in the interest of a fair trial outweighs the advantages to be
gained from publicity,15 the judge is not entitled to make this decision

6 Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637 (1896); State v. Keeler, 52
Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916).
7In re Oliver 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
8 19 Ariz. 457, 172 P. 278 (1918). All except those necessary to the conduct
of the trial and newspaper reporters were excluded because of an embarrassed
female witness. For further discussion, see Comment, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 474, 477,
wherein it is stated, "The Keddington case further quite correctly points out that
the number in the courtroom is not the acid test and that the presence of the press
tends to make the trial more public than a house full of idlers."
9The view seems to stem from a statement by judge Cooley referring only to
constitutional provisions and not considering common law customs. T. CooLEY,
CONSTrnuTONAL LMIrrATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927).
10 J. BENTHAm, RATIONALE oCF "uiAL EvmENcE 524 (1827). See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 338 (1966) and Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912 (1950), which contain excellent discussions of this view. For an
enumeration and discussion of the benefits accruing to the public from a public
trial see 6 J. WIGMOPE,EvmENcE, § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
"1Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (Ex. 1829).
12In State v. White, 97 Ariz. 196, 398 P.2d 903, 904 (1965), the Arizona
court stated, "The community is deeply interested in the right to observe the
administration of justice and we feel the presence of its members at a public trial
is as basic as that of a defendant."
13 See Justice Black's opinion in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). For more
discussion on this point see 67IHAv.L. REv. 344 (1953).
14 A. EsMn , HIsTORY oF CONTNNTAL CsmrNAL ProcnuRnn 145-64, 16672, 397, 439, 442 (1913). It was not the secret procedure that was so objectionable; it was the practices accompanying it.
15 The characteristic of the 'publicity" is significant in Johnson. It seems that
the publication of the names of juveniles involved in adult proceedings is quite
unrelated to the insurance of justice. The Wisconsin state legislature reflected this
view by enacting a statute forbidding publishing the names of female rape
(Continued on next page)

CoMNmqrs
on either his own motion or in concurrence with the desires of the
parties.'8
The specific issue as to the right of the press as members of the
public to protest their exclusion from a criminal trial was litigated in
the New York case of United Press Associations v. Valente.17 There the
defendant judge, exercising his discretion, had excluded the press as
well as the general public from a criminal trial when testimony dealing
with the sordid details of prostitution and pandering was expected. In
the appeal of the criminal trial itself,' it was held that the defendant
had been denied his right to a public trial in order to grant a lesser
protection, that of preserving public morals and decency. However,
Valente held that the order of exclusion did not deprive the press associtations and newspaper publishers of any right of which they could
19
complain.
The Valente case can be distinguished from Johnson in that the
judge excluded everyone in the former and only a segment of the
public, one part of the press, in the latter. Further, the former acted in
order to protect public morals and decency while the latter acted to
protect juveniles involved in the trial from having their names published. Kentucky has no statute or law prohibiting this type of
publication,2 0 and the Court appealed to the legislature to enact such
a statute.2 '
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

victims. Wis. STAT. § 348.412 (1945). This statute has been upheld by their
courts in State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
16 Comment, Constitutional Law-Public Trial in Criminal Cases, 52 MIc. L.
REv. 128 (1953).
17 308 N.Y. 71 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
18 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 NE.2d 769 (1954).
19
2 308 N.Y. at 71, 123 N.E.2d at 777.
0 Op.ATrry Gm. 42095 (1958).
21
Although the Court adopted a restrained view on the issue regarding the
publication of the names of juveniles, its language urges the enactment of a
statute similar to the Wisconsin statute discussed in note 15, supra.
Sociological studies reveal the harmful and unnecessary effects from such
publication. Social scientists familiar with the juvenile courts and its problems
in the main agree that one of the great unwanted consequences of juvenile
involvement is the imposition of stigma. Such stigma gets translated into effective
handicaps by lowered receptivity and tolerance by school officials, rejections of
youths by prospective employers and degradation in general by those who know
of the involvement..Large numbers of youths appearing in juvenile court have
lower class status or that of disadvantaged minorities, whose limited commitments
to education already create diffeulties for them in a society where education is
increasingly a condition precedent to access to economic opportunity.
Proposals, laws, and administrative action to preserve the anonymity of
juvenile court proceedings through closed hearings, sealing case records, and
expunging records are probably worthy moves, but it is vain to expect them to
eliminate the stigma of "contact" with the juvenile court.
While the successful management of stigma by individuals is not impossible,
the necessary insights and social skills are not given to many people, least of all
(Continued on next page)
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The Court in Johnson relied heavily on a prior Kentucky case,
Beauchamp v. Cahill,22 and an Arizona decision, Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County.23 In Beauchamp,
an attorney was excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The attorney represented
a client who was charged with the same offense by the same prosecutrix.2 4 The Court held that the attorney had a legitimate interest
in the proceedings and was entitled to remain as a matter of right.P
In the Phoenix Newspapers case, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that courts were prohibited from limiting by court order the right of
newspapers to print news and inform the public of that which
transpired in open court. 26 The Court in Johnson further followed dictum of the Arizona court in stating that: "Courts are public institutions.... To permit a hearing held in open court to be kept secret
...
would take from the public its right to be informed of a proceeding
to which it is an interested party."27 The Court has, in essence, considered that an attorney is to his client much the same as the press is
to the public in having a legitimate right to be present at court proceedings.
It seems clear that the Court's reasoning, analysis, and application
of the law in this case were justifiable. Since it was an adult trial and
open, and since no Kentucky statutes prohibited the publication of
juveniles' names, the county judge had little with which to support
his position.
The importance of this twofold decision on the exclusion issue and
on the issue regarding publication of the names of juveniles will lie in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

to immature youths or those struggling with other status handicaps. A number
of social psychologists believe that social rejections provoked by such stigma may
reinforce an individual's self-image that he is no good or that he can't make it on
the outside. They may further feed some brooding sense of injustice which finds
expression in delinquency; or they may support, strengthen, and perpetuate
ideological aspects of delinquent subcultures. In this sense the court, because of
this stigma attached to the juvenile, may become a connecting link causing delinquency. See generally, TnE PB Es DNf's Com~russioN oN LAW ErORcEN4Tzr AND
ADmINsTRAnox

oF JusTicE, TAHS:

Foncm

REP oT: Juvmwm DE i.QumcY AND

YoU= Canvm, at 91-106 (1967).
22297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944).
23 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966).
24 297 Ky. at 507, 180 S.W.2d at 424.
25 Id. at 507, 180 S.W.2d at 425.
26 101 Ariz. at-, 418 P.2d at 594.
27 Id. at-, 418 P.2d at 595. It is well to remember that the Arizona court
protected the community's interest in criminal trials and felt that the public's right
to attend trials is as basic as the right of the defendant. Further, the Kentucky
Court's language explains that the news media should be accorded some priority
in protecting the rights of the public because they have the facilities to disseminate
information regarding what transpires in court to a much broader audience than
those who can gather in a crowded courtroom.
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its effect on, first, subsequent case holdings and, second, subsequent
statutes enacted by the legislature. On the broader issue of exclusion,
the Court has apparently rejected the New York view as expressed in
Valente28 by holding that the press, as members of the public, do
have an enforceable right to attend court proceedings (or at least
public trials). This aspect of the decision could be abused. However, if newspapers do not seek to control the course of court proceedings, but only report what they are entitled to "see, behold, and
hear,"29 then the public's right to be in attendance at court proceedings as an interested party will be protected and the public will
have gained a needed right in order to promote and preserve proper
administration of justice. Concerning the issue regarding publication

of the names of juveniles involved in trials, the Court has taken a
stand which hopefully will bring about enactment of a statute by the
legislature which will serve to protect witnesses and victims from the
unnecessary consequences of social degradation.
Julia Johns Kurtz

InuN-MuNiciPAL LLmnrr.-In March,
1964, the Ohio River was rising toward flood stage at Louisville. Representatives of the Louisville Seed Company contacted the City of
Louisville and received assurances from the flood control department,
the mayor and other city officials that gates in the municipal flood wall
system would be in place in time to prevent damage to the company's
property and merchandise. The flood wall gates were not installed in
time and the company's property and inventory were damaged by
the resulting flood. The Louisville Seed Co. brought suit against the
City of Louisville for damages based on the city's negligence in failing
to install the gates. The plaintiff was awarded a judgment on a jury
verdict in the amount of $86,771.48. The City of Louisville appealed.
Held: Reversed. A municipal corporation may not be held liable in
tort for the negligent performance of a function which is inherently
part of the carrying on of government and where the performance of
this function affects all members of the general public alike. City of
Louisville v. Louiswille Seed Company, 483 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1968).
One of the most difficult and confusing problems which the Kentucky Court and other courts throughout the nation have had to face
TORTs-SovBEIGN

Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 808 N.Y. 71, 128 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
LeViness, Cime News, 66 U.S. L. REv. 370 (1932).

28 United
29

